

MEMORANDUM FOR: Karl

This was in General Wetters' box. Shouldn't we kick it down to someone for coordination with Army.

Nancy

16 Sept 75  
(DATE)

FORM NO. 101 REPLACES FORM 10-101  
1 AUG 54 WHICH MAY BE USED.

(47)

Army review(s) completed.

**SECRET**

Executive Registry

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**DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY**  
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR INTELLIGENCE  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

DAMI-FII

28 AUG 1975

Lieutenant General Vernon A. Walters, USA  
Deputy Director  
Central Intelligence Agency  
Washington, D. C. 20505

Dear Dick:

One of the most critical tasks confronting Army Intelligence at this time is ascertaining more precisely the ground attack mission assigned to Soviet Frontal Aviation. GEN Kerwin, the Army Vice Chief of Staff, has directed OACSI "as a matter of the highest intelligence priority to the Army," to determine the extent to which the Soviet air force provides close air support to ground troops. In the past we have held the position that Frontal Aviation does not normally carry the mission of providing close air support, at least in the strictest sense of that term as defined by JCS Publication #1, "Air attacks against hostile targets which are in close proximity to friendly forces and which require detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of those forces."

However, there are some indications from both collateral and sensitive sources that the Soviets may be considering the concept that high-performance tactical aviation will support ground forces near the FEBA, at least in certain circumstances. I hope to resolve this problem through an intensive study being undertaken by OACSI's Directorate of Foreign Intelligence, due out by 25 September. In view of the limited time available and the criticality of the task, I would like to encourage maximum direct contact between my analysts and those assigned to CIA. Any assistance your people may be able to render OACSI in the study will be greatly appreciated.

Sincerely,

**HAROLD R. AARON**  
Major General, GS  
ACoS for Intelligence

CLASSIFIED BY ACSI  
SUBJECT TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652 AUTOMATICALLY DOWNGRADED AT TWO YEAR INTERVALS DECLASSIFIED ON 31 DECEMBER 1983

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*Planning  
Paper  
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QUESTIONS WE WISH WE HAD ANSWERS TO

- What is Soviet central war strategy?
- What is the Soviet leadership's view of the requirements for stable deterrence?
- What is the Soviet view of the importance of the Chinese threat to our SALT negotiations?
- Do the Soviets view FBS as a political or a military problem? To what extent do they use FBS as a negotiating ploy?
- How do the Soviets view the role of missile throw-weight in a technological arms race? Do they see "qualitative improvements" as negotiable issues?
- Are the Soviets moving toward a "blue water" strategy for their nuclear forces?
- Are the Soviets moving toward building a heavy bomber force?
- Why have the Soviets stepped up the pace and breadth of their MIRV developmental effort?
- Why do the Soviets continue to press vigorously their ABM R&D in the face of U.S. cutbacks in this area?
- How dominant is the military in determining Soviet SALT policy? To what extent do their military see our programs as triggers for a reaction process?
- To what extent do the Soviet scientists view our programs as technological advances rather than possible bargaining chips?
- How important are the roles of EMIEMO and USA Institute in Soviet policy formulation? How important is the role played by the scientists?
- How badly do they need technology transfers? What fields other than computers and managerial expertise are important?
- What evidence is there that SALT has led to a transfer of Soviet technological resources (human and material) from the military sphere to consumer oriented spheres?
- Do the Soviets believe that our internal difficulties place us in a poor negotiating position in SALT II?

- Will the Solzhenitsyn-Sakharov affairs affect Soviet negotiating positions in SALT II?
- To what extent is Brezhnev committed to detente? How important is it to his personal position if he fails to get an agreement in SALT II?
- What would be good indicators that the Soviets view SALT as an instrument toward a more stable world?